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i$ab s sampk; containing DNA has been 
'sssertedlyby 1: the defendant, at the 
-6 of the t r i c k  or some other material 
brigion. Ancli+@j$b, the d e f a h t k  DNA 
&chis that of @:=&me sample. But the 
& cases are &@ER~ in at least one critical 
$spect. In the fi  k t  case, what we will call 
p@~confimt.imi awe," other evidence has 
H e  the defenet  a suspect and so war- 
ranted testing l$is DNA. In the Mher, what 
we HiH call the.%wl case," the DNA 
match itself made tee defendant a suspect, 
md the m a d # g ~  discovered only by 
a database of previously 
B, ; 2... L. -1' . undexiiks pe&hng amendments to the 
kdemt$u&s of Evidence and pervades the 
supra% h r t k  decision in Daubert v. 
PharmaceuticaZs Inc. and its . 
e e r a l  EZecrtic CQ. v John and . 
The Co. v. Camtichael, as we13 as 
regunor, Fye v. United States. We d 
i fiir k s  deferential appmach. I 
, k summarize the nature of DNA ; 
and explain the database search 
. We contrast two types of cases. In I 
case has been the model for most uses of 
DNA evidence up to now. But the recent 
creation of a national database containing 
profiles of past offenders means that the 
trawl case will become increasingly irnpor- 
tant over the coming years. 
Next, we discuss the NRCs analyses of 
the question of whether and how the DNA 
evidence should be presented in the trawl 
case, and we present our own contrasting 
analysis. The first NRC report (NRC I), in 
1992, opposed admission of the evidence 
altogether. NRC I proposed that a match 
&covered after a database search should 
provide the basis for performing further 
tests on a new sample taken from the sus- 
pect identified by the match, but that the 
evidence of the initial match should not be 
presented to the jury The second NRC 
report (NRC 11), issued four years later in 
1996, takes a substantially more generous 
view, but still calls for a testifying expert to 
drast~cally understate the value of the evidence. 
In our view, the caution reflected in the 
NRC reports and in the analyses of those 
who have taken a similar perspective on the 
problem is unwarranted. The fact that the 
DNA match was found only after a search, 
possibly of many thousands of samples, 
does not diminish the value of the evi- 
dence. On the contrary, the fact that other 
potentla1 suspects have been eliminated as 
possible sources of the crime sample slight- 
ly raises the value of the evidence. No 
downward adjustment in the force of the 
evidence is appropriate. (Indeed, the confir- 
mation case and the trawl case are really 
poles of a continuum, and analysis of the 
two cases is fundamentally the sarne.) It 
may well be that the total weight of the evi- 
dence is less in the trawl case than in the 
confirmation case; there may be less incul- 
patory evidence in the trawl case, and the 
identification of the defendant in that case 
may taint any later-developed evidence by 
suggestiveness. But this is an entirely 
dderent matter, and one that can be left to 
the or* process of argument to the jury; 
it does not require any rules restricting the 
force ascribed to the DNA evidence or the 
manner in which that evidence is presented. 
rounding DNA database searches may skip 
to the final portion of this article (which 
begins on page 92). There we argue that the 
dfficulty manifested by the NRC reports 
has arisen in part from the tendency of sta- 
tisticians to export to the legal context 
methods that were developed to assist sci- 
entific inquiries and that appear more suit- 
able in that context than in adjudication. 
But part of the problem also arises from the 
tendency of courts to defer to the scientific 
establishment with respect to matters of sci- 
entific evidence. We suggest that the solu- 
tion lies less in a "gatekeeping" role of the 
type prescribed by Frye, as well as by 
Daubert , Ioiner, and Kumho, designed to 
keep out disreputable expert evidence, and 
more in the role of aggressive consumer. 
When courts allow experts to present evi- 
dence in court, it is to perform a service for 
the legal system. The courts should try to 
ensure that the experts are doing so in a 
way designed to serve the needs of that 
system and are not bound by the experts' 
own professional habits. 
DNA evidence and the 
database search problem 
To understand the database search prob- 
lem, it is necessary to understand some 
aspects of DNA evidence - but, mercifully, 
only some of the less techcal ones. 
DNA is a remarkably complex type of 
molecule that is sometimes said to contain 
the genetic blueprint of life. DNA is con- 
tained in the nucleus of virtually all cells of 
every living organism. Within a given 
organism, the DNA is effectively the same 
from cell to cell. The entirety of an individ- 
ual organism's DNA is referred to as its 
genome. In humans, the genome consists of 
two collections, one inherited from each 
parent, of about three billion building 
blocks, called bases. Human DNA is 
extremely similar across individuals. This 
shared genetic material is what makes us 
human and btinguishes us from other life 
forms. At a multitude of sites in the 
genome, however, there are variations from 
one human to another; typically, two unre- 
in 1,000. These variations are what y k e  
humans genetically d8erent from each 
other. Except for identical twins, no two 
humans have DNA that is identical 
throughout the whole genome. 
The consistency of DNA throughout a 
given person's body, and the uniqueness of 
a given personls DNA, are what mak DNA 
evidence so valuable for identification pur- 
poses. In determining whether the DNA 
from two separate samples comes from the 
same person, it is not possible given the 
current state of science tocoinpar& them 
over the whole genome. Current testing 
techniques use several markers. Each mark- 
er targets a particular place, or locus, on the 
genome. For DNA profiling techniques, loci 
are chosen & display considerable vari- 
ability among individuals. In most current 
methodsms variability is manifested by 
differences in the length, measured by the 
number of bases or the number of times a 
given sequence repeats, between pre-speci- 
fied locations. This procedure will yield two 
measurements for each sample for each 
locus, one for the father's side and one fo 
the mother's side. & 
If the pair of measurements from one 
sample qt a given locus is the sarne as the 
pair of measurements from another sample 
at that locus, the profiles are said to match 
at that locus; otherwise, they are said not to 
match at that locus. If the two profiles 
match at each of the loci examined, the pro- 
files are said to match. If the profiles fail to 
match at one or more loci, then the profiles 
do not match, and it is virtually certain - 
putting aside, as we do throughout this ad- 
cle, the possibility of laborato~y error - 
that the samples do not come from the 
same person. 
Our concern here is with the case in 
which the profiles do match. A match d m  
not mean that the two samples must 
absolutely have come from the same source; 
all that can be said is that, so far as the test 
was able to determine, the two samples 
were identical, but it is possible for more 
than one person to haw the same profile as 
inhcated by a test even of several loci. At 
any given locus, the percentage of people 
having DNA fragments of a given length is 
small but not infinitesimal. DNA tests gain 
[heir power from the conjunction of match- 
es at each of several loci; it is extremely rare 
[or two samples taken from unrelated mdi- 
\iciuals to show such congruence over 
many loci. 
But just how rare? That question must 
be addressed if the strength of the DNA 
match is to be assessed. Databases of DNA 
samples from various populations have 
been collected, and from these it is possible 
to estimate how common any p e n  frag- 
ment length is at a given locus. It is typical- 
ly assumed that the measurements ylelded 
by each of the markers used in forensic 
DNA profiling are independent of one 
nother. This assumption enables a forensic 
cientist to multiply probabilities. This mul- 
cation can yleld 17er)i low estimates of 
probability that a p e n  innocent person 
.om the demographic group described by 
e database would have a DNA profile 
atching the profile common to both of 
ese samples. Figures in the range of one 
millions down to one in many billions 
are typical of profiling systems now in use. 
So far so good; there are complexities 
nd controversies in the process we have 
escribed, but they are not our concern 
ere, and for the most part this process is 
y now rather well-accepted. Our concein 
with the process by which the matching 
ples came to be tested, and the implica- 
s that this has for the value oi the evi- 
ence and the manner in which it should 
DNA can be used to test for identity in 
arious contexls in litigation, but we will 
cus on the most important setting. A 
rime has been conlmitted and a person, 
ssertedly the perpetrator, has left a sample 
f fluid or tissue containing testable DNA at 
e scene of the crime or at some other 
ene associated with the clime. This Sam- 
e is often known as the "crime sample." 
e police lznow that if they find a person 
ose DNA matches that of the crime Sam- 
e they may have round the perpetrator. 
OTV we will consider two scenarios by 
hich the police might find a match. In 
ach scenario, we will call the person whose 
The Confirmation Case. In the first sce- 
nario, what we will call the confirmation 
case, there is a substantial amount of ex<- 
dence pointing to Matcher before his DNA 
is even tested. This evidence might include 
testimony by a victim of the crime or some 
other eyewitness identifying Matcher as the 
perpetrator. It might also include a trail of 
blood or other circumstantial evidence lead- 
ing, literally or figuratively, from the crime 
to Matcher. In any event, the police, believ- 
ing that they may have their man, secure a 
DNA test of Matclher. Sure enough, the 
"suspect sample," as it is often known, 
matches the crime sample. 
Just how this evidence should be pre- 
sented is a difficult question. One method 
that is widely used, and that at least for pre- 
sent purposes we regard as satisfactory, 
states the match pi-obabili~. Ths is the prob- 
ability that, if nothing were laown about a 
person other than that he was a member of 
some defined population, his DNA profile 
would match that of the cnme sample. This 
probability quantifies the rareness of an 
"innocent" or "chance" match. 
The Trawl Case. In the second scenario 
- what we are calling the "trawl case" - 
apart from the crime sample, the police do 
not at first have evidence that narrows their 
search to one suspect, or even to a few This 
might, for instance, be a rape case in whch 
the rapist was a stranger to the victim and 
was not apprehended immediately after the 
crime. But the police do have the crime 
sample. And they also have a database con- 
taining profiles of DNA samples taken from 
a large number of people, one of whom 
nziglzt be the perpetrator. Sure enough, the 
database search ylelds one profile, and only 
one, that matches the crime sample. The 
police then try to find further evidence 
incriminating the source of that profile, 
Matcher, and perhaps they find it. Perhaps, 
for example, when Matcher is brought 
before the victim, she identifies him as the 
perpetrator. 
The trawl case will take on increasing 
importance m coming years. Development 
has been fast in England and \Vales, where 
since 1995 DNA profiles have been taken 
routinely from. along others, all persons 
charged with a "recordable offence." As of 
July 2000, nearly 80,000 crime samples 
had been matched to profiles in this data- 
base and more than 11,000 matches had 
been made between samples from different 
crimes. I11 the United States, development 
of a national database has been much more 
complex. I11 part because of the encourage- 
ment, including financial incentives, offered 
by the DNA Identification Act of 1994, all 
50 states now require designated sets of 
convicted offenders to provide DNA sam- 
ples for analysis. The state databases oper- 
ate in accordance with national quality 
assurance standards and software designed 
by the FBI and participate in the Combined 
DNA Information System (CODIS) main- 
tained by the FBI. Since October 1998, the 
FBI has been able to compare the profile of 
a DNA sample from a crime scene with all 
the profiles in the system. Thus, CODIS 
now operates in effect as a national data- 
base. As of April 2000, laboratories report- 
ed analyzing more than 360,000 offender 
profiles for entry into CODIS, with nearly 
400,000 more waiting to be analyzed. As of 
the same time, CODIS had been responsi- 
ble for over 600 "hits," assisting in more 
than 1,100 investigations. These numbers 
will almost certainly increase dramatically 
within the next few years. 
Over time, one can ima,@e databases 
even broader than the current ones; finger- 
prints are now routinely taken from 
arrestees as well as convicts, and from many 
persons not suspected of crime, and it is 
plausible to suppose that the same will 
occur with respect to DNA sanlples. 
Indeed, the manager of the English data- 
base - which operates under fewer admin- 
istrative and constitutional constraints than 
its counterpart in the United States - has 
said he expects that eventually it will 
include a third of all English men between 
the ages of 16 and 30. 
And now we can perceive what we have 
called the database search problem. In the 
confinmation case, the fact tl~at Matcher's 
sample, the only one tested, inatched the 
crime sample is clearly powerful evidence 
that Matcher was the source of the crime 
sample. But in the trawl case. many samples 
were tested, without a finger already point- 
ing to ally particular suspect. How does t h s  
factor affect the stmmgth of the evidence of on the anal* to which NRC I1 gave pri- . 
a DNA match? How, if at all, should that rnacy) According to NRC 11, an "imponant 
evidence be presented in court? We now diffemce," a difference of a "logical!'-nature. 
turn to that problem. between the c o ~ t i o n  case and the 
aawl uw is illustrated by this simple set bf 
statistical hcts: 
It Analyzing the database 
search problem 
The NRC Reports. h NRC I, a 
Committee on DNA Technology in Forensic 
Science specially appointed by the NRC 
said: "The &tinction between finding a 
match between an evidence sample and a 
suspect sample and finding a match 
between an evidence sample and one of 
many entries in a DNA profile database is 
important. The chance of finding a match 
in the second case is considerably higher, 
because one does not start with a single 
hypothesis to test (i.e., that the evidence 
was left by a particular suspect), but instead 
fishes through the databank, trying out 
many hypotheses." 
Thus, the committee pointed out, "[Ilf a 
pattern has a frequency of 1 in 10,000, 
there would still be a considerable probabil- 
ity (about 10 perrent) of seeing it by chance 
in a databank of 1,000 people." The report 
recommended a cautious solution: A match 
between an "evidence sample" - what we 
are calling the crime sample - and a pro- 
file in a database "should be used only as 
the basis for further testing using markers at 
additional loci." That is, evidence of the ini- 
tial match should be deemed "probable 
causen for securing a blood sample from the 
person so identified, and comparing it with 
the evidence sample using markers that 
were not used in the initial test. What is 
more, if the second test indicates that the 
two samples match, "only the statistical fre- 
quency associated with the additional loci 
should be presented at trial (to prevent the 
selection bias that is mherent in searching a 
databank)." 
NRC I1 offered an analysis of the data- 
base search problem that was quite simdar 
to that of NRC I, but recommended a sub- 
stanually more lenient solution. (Actually, as 
we explain in our longer Michigan Law 
Review article, NRC I1 offered two some- 
what drfferent analyses; we concentrate here 
" [ I ]  f we toss 20 reputedly unbiased coins 
once each, there is roughly one chance 
in a million that all 2 0 . d  show heads. 
According to standard statistical logic, 
the occurrence of tlm l-ughly unlikely , 
event would be regarded as evidence 
discrediting the hypothesis that the coins 
are unbiased. But if we repeat this exper- 
iment of 20 tosses a large enough num- 
ber of times, there d l  be a high prob'a- 
bility that all 20 coins will show heads in 
at least one experiment. In that case, an 
event of 20 heads would not be unusual 
and would not in itself be judged as evi- 
dence that the coins are biased." 
Further, contended the report, " [t] he ini- 
tlal identification of a suspect through a 
search of a DNA database is analogous to 
performing the coin-toss experiment rnany 
times: A match by chance alone is more 
likely the larger the number of p r o h  
examined." t 
Essential to NRC 11, therefore, is the per- 
ception that the more profiles examined, 
the less probative the evidence. And NRC I1 
recommends how this supposedly dimin- 
ished probative value ought to be commu- 
nicated to the jury As we have indicated 
above, an expert may tesufy as to the pmb- 
ability that a sample taken from an arbitrar- 
ily chosen member of the relevant popula- 
tion would match the crime sample. In 
determining that probabty, NRC I1 pro- 
vides, the expert should take the probability 
that she would USR if only one sample were 
compared to the clime sample, as in the 
confirmation case, and then multiply that 
probability by the number of profiles in the 
searched database. If there are hundreds of 
thousands or even millions of profiles in the 
database, this adjustment may make what 
appeared to be an implausible chance of a 
coinci&nt.al match - b l a s e  the proba- 
bility was so low - seem m be far more 
substantial. The DNA A d W q  board of the 
FBI has endorsed this appmach. 
Thus, though tbe NRC reports &&r in 
their ultimate recmendations, their 
analyses ok the database senreh problem are 
very sirmlar. We believe that these a n a l p ,  
and those of scholars who have supporked 
the NRC approach, are clearly wronp We 
can~ot show here all the anomalies df 
NRC approach that we discuss in our 
longer article. But we will say ahugh m 
show that the NRC approach asks the 
wrong question, arid that it fails to mq- 
nize the full import of evidence of idem%- 
cation based on a d a t a b ~  qbrch. 
Our v i ~ .  The p ro~e  view of the situa- 
tion reflects a rather simple intuition. The 
valueof a DNA match is attributable to the 
rarity of the profile. If the DNA of a particu- 
lar person matches the crime sample, that 
evidence stmngly supports the proposition 
that that person was the source of the crime 
sampE that is, the evidence makes that 
appear far more probable tban 
it did before the match was known.. That 
other sarqples have been tested and found 
not to match does not weaken the probative 
value of the match, with respect to this par- 
tinnlar proposition, which is the one of ~IW- 
est at the time of trial. On the contrary, tki  
result somewhat strengthens the prob~dve 
valuqof the match, because it elirnu&tes 
some other persons as potential sources. 
How probable it appean that the particular 
person is the source depends not only on 
the DNA evidence but also on the other evi- 
dence inl the case. If there is no other evi- 
dence pointing to kum, then the proposition 
will not appear as ldcely as if there were 
such evidence - not beduse the DNA evi- 
dence is any less valuable, but because the 
prior probability of the proposition is so 
low. And evidence found after the DNA 
match is determined might be subject to a 
ground of skepticism - the possibhty of 
suggestiveness created by the match itself 
- not applicable to evidence found before- 
hand. Thus, the probability that the dcfen- 
dant is the source of the crime sample may 
well appear less in the trawl case than in 
the confirmation case, but t b  is not 
because the DNA evidence itself is any 
weaker in the trawl case. 
Both NRC I and NRC I1 emphasized 
that, as the number of profiles tested 
increases, so too does the probability of 
finding a match wi~h  the crime sample. 
That is indisputably true. One can even say 
that the larger a database is the more likely 
it is that the da~abase will yield at least one 
false positive result - a profile that match- 
es the crime scene sample but that does not 
come from the source of that sample. But 
the conclusion that the NRC reports draw is 
that the larger a database is (up to a point) 
the less valuable is evidence that a database 
trawl ylelded a single match. Here the NRC 
and its supporters go wrong. 
The proposition that the DNA evidence 
s offered to prove is not the broad one that 
he source of the ciime sample is a person 
epresented in the database. Rather, it is 
hat one particular person - the de$endant in 
he case at Izand - is tlze soLtrce of that 
alnple. And the evidence bearing on this 
roposition is not simply that there was one 
atcli within the database. Rather, it is that 
e DNA oJ that partic~tlnr person - alone o j  
11 tlzose tested - nzatches tlze cliilze sample. 
Now consider in addition the fact that 
ther samples have in fact been tested and 
ound not to match the crime sample. With 
espect to the precise proposition at issue 
that Matcher is the source of the crime 
mple - this fact can only enlzance, not 
iminish, the probative value of the DNA 
vidence. One reason for this is that the 
dditional information that a significant 
ber of persons have been tested and 
d not to match the crime sample can 
make the profile of that sample appear 
than it did absent that inforn-~ation. 
otentially more important, a number of 
eople other than the defendant who previ- 
usly appeared to be possible sources of the 
lime sample have now been eliminated, 
US inalzing each ol the remaining possibil- 
s somewhat more probable. Assuining, 
1s usually the case, that the size of the 
atabase is veiy small in comparison to the 
pect population, this effect will be negli- 
le, but as the size of the database 
lcreases in compaiison to that population, 
the effect becomes dominant. If the data- 
base includes the entire suspect population, 
then the existence of only one match points 
the finger without doubt (assuming accu- 
rate testing) at the person so identified. This 
fact alone, that the all-inclusive database 
makes the existence of one match essential- 
ly conclusive evidence, shows that the NRC 
analysis, which treats the DNA evidence as 
less valuable the more profiles are in the 
database, must be mistaken. 
The point may be made even clearer by 
considering an analogy that draws the 
NRC's hypothetical involving repeated coin 
flips closer to the reality of DNA testing. 
Suppose one coin !mown to be biased, but 
otherwise indistinguishable from all those 
in a piggybank, is thrown into the bank. A 
tester picks from the bank at random a 
handful of coins and hps  each of them 20 
times. Each lands heads up approximately 
10 times except for one coin that shows 
heads on all 20 flips. These results are pow- 
erful, though not conclusir~e, evidence that 
this one coin is the biased coin that was 
thrown into the bank. Just how powerful 
the evidence is depends on how common 
biased coins are believed to be in the bank. 
But two points seem utterly clear: The evi- 
dence that the one 20-heads-up coin is the 
biased one thrown into the bank is made 
stronger, not less strong, by the fact that 
other coins were tried and appeared to be 
unbiased, and the more other coins [hat are 
tested, the stronger the evidence is. 
Thus, the DNA evidence itself is 112ore, 
not less probative the more profiles have 
been searched. Nevertheless, given the same 
DNA match, the entire Zlodji qf evidence may 
well be stronger in a typical confirmation 
case than in a trawl case, which involves 
many searches. There at least ~ w o  reasons 
\vl-~y this is so. 
First, by definition, in the confirmation 
case there is enough evidence independent 
of the DNA evidence to cast strong suspi- 
cion on the eventual defendant. By defini- 
tion, [hat is not tme before the da~abase 
search in the trawl case, and it may noL be 
true even after. And iL may well be that, 
even after Lhe trawl identifies the defendan~ 
as having DNA inatching [hat or the ciime 
sample, there is little or no other evidence 
tending to suggest that he is the perpetrator 
of the crime. Assuming that this is true, and 
that the database searched in the trawl case 
was not very large in proportion to the sus- 
pect population, the entire body of evi- 
dence will plainly be stronger in the confir- 
mation case than in the trawl case. Of 
course, it may still be strong enough in the 
trawl case to warrant conviction. 
Second, even if the evidence in the two 
cases, the non-DNA evidence as well as the 
DNA evidence, is comparable, it may 
appear to have greater weight in the confir- 
mation case than in the trawl case. Suppose 
that in the confirmation case the police 
compile a powerful case against Matcher, 
based on circumstantial evidence and eye- 
witness identification, and only at the end 
of their investigation conduct the DNA test. 
And suppose that in the trawl case the 
police, having identified Matcher as a sus- 
pect only through a database search, focus 
their inquiries wi1l-I such success that they 
are able to compile the same circumstantial 
and eyewitness identification evidence. In 
such a case, it xnay be plausible that the 
subsequently discovered evidence was taint- 
ed by suggestiveness, gven that the DNA 
match motivated the police, and possibly 
witnesses as ~vell, to confirnl the suggestion 
that the perpetrator had been found. 
These possibilities mean that the confir- 
mation and trawl cases will not necessarily 
look the same, even assuming that the DNA 
evidence in the two is of a match with the 
same profile. But these are factors that a 
jury, aided by the arguments of counsel, can 
easily take into account. It is not hard, for 
example, for a defense attoiney to argue, 
"Escep~ for t h s  DNA evidence, the prose- 
cution does not have a shred of evidence 
against my client. And the prosecutor's akin 
es~ei-t  acknowledged that there could well 
be several other people in the world with 
the same DNA." Similarly defense counsel 
could argue, "The police and the eyewit- 
nesses were hun,gy to find the perpetrator. 
After they got this DNA match, naturally 
they constructed a case to fit the hypothesis 
01 my client's guilt." No technical es~ertise 
is necessary to make ihese arguments, and 
no adjustment in presentation of the DNA 
evidence is required. 
The two factors discussed above may 
account in part for the intuitive sense of 
some observers - including the NRC com- 
mittees - that the probative value of a 
DNA match is weakened by the fact that it 
is found after a database search. But in fact, 
as we have argued, it is not that the DNA 
evidence is weakened; rather, it is possible 
that the other evidence in the case tends to 
be weaker if, and to some extent because, 
identification from a database trawl has led 
to it. 
The aspiration to objectivity 
We believe there are also deeper reasons 
for the NRC enors, and for the wihgness 
of legal players to adopt those errors. We 
believe that some habits of statisticians and 
scientists make them prone to errors of this 
sort, and that a judicial tendency towards 
deference diminishes the ability of courts to 
make good use of scientific and statistical 
evidence. 
Science aspires to objectivity, to the 
demonstration of propositions that are not 
dependent on the subjective views of the 
observer. Accordingly, it is highly depen- 
dent on experiments in which given sets of 
conditions are observed many times. By 
counting or measuring different conse- 
quences in different condtions, a scientist 
can hope to draw conclusions on the asso- 
ciations between conditions and conse- 
quences. 
Accordingly, classical statistics grew up 
to facilitate objective inferences from data. 
Classical statisticians try to avoid subjective 
judgments, seekmg instead to determine 
what conclusions can be drawn solely on 
the basis of frequency of observation. The 
Bayesian approach - updating the odds 
assigned to a given proposition in light of 
evidence subsequently received - is thus 
unacceptable to classical statisticians 
because it depends on the subjective assign- 
ment of odds in the absence of objectively 
measurable data. Instead, the classical statis- 
tician, having selected a hypothesis t~ be 
tested but without having assigned any 
probability to that proposition, observes 
whether the results of an experiment are of 
a h i d y  unusual nature assuming the mth  
of that proposition. If they are, then the sta- . 
tisticiarl concludes that the hypothesis ean 
be rejected. Under this approach, great cau- 
tion must be exexised in testing more than 
one hypothesis ~imuli'aneousl~ became the 
more observations p made the more likely 
it becomes that some will be ;unusual even 
though n o h g  remarkable happened. 
The NRC approach clearly reflects 
classical method. NRC I emphasized 
with a database trawl "one does not start 
with a single hypothesis to test (i.e., that the 
evidence was left by a particular suspect), 
but instead fishes through the databank, 
tryrng out many hypotheses." Thus, no con- 
clusion could be drawn from the fact of a 
match produced by the trawl; instead, the 
match "should be used only as the basis for 
further testing using markers at additional 
loci." In other words, the initial match 
yielded by the search identifies the hypoth- 
esis to be tested, and nothing more. 
Though NRC I1 did not recommend the 
same solution, its analysis of the problem 
' 
was very similar. Recall NRC II's discussion 
of an experiment in which 20 coins are - 
tossed in the air repeatedly and eventudly 
they come up all heads. Applying the 
lessons of "standard statistical logic," NRC I1 ' 
said that this experiment proves nothing, 
because given enough trials it is unsurpris- 
ing that some of them will have unusual 
results. And this analogy, N K  I1 main- 
tained, was on point for the database search 
problem, because the more profiles 
searched - the more hypotheses tested - 
the greater the chance of flnding one that 
matches the crime sample purely by coinci- 
dence. 
The NRC seems not to have recognized 
how different the enterprise of law is fiom I 
the scientific enterprise for which the classi- 
cal statistical model was developed. The 
problem facing an investigator or a juror is 
not to determine a general law of the uni- 
- . - ,  
verse. Rather, the inm-tcxr + 
determime who c ~ ~ e a e d  a 
a giMn occasi~n; the )mi% 
rower, seeking to detamhe 
given pemn; on wham its am- 
been focused, committe 
Sub$ctiVe assessment, in 
a conclusion, or that it wants to p 
experiment trmxertain the facts. I 
make itsbest assessment of the 
basis of, the mfon-ption w i h  
Thus, where the evidence ten 
that the person who left a p 
sample at a particular place 
perpetrator, it becomes of imp0 
jury whether the defendant is the s 
that sample.'-The jury should 
likely the DNA evidence wou 
defendant were the sounce to 
would arise if he were not the so 
the jury should combine these 
with its subjective a s ~ e ~ s ~ e h t s  of all I%@ ' 
other evidence in the case to mess tlae: 
probability of guilt. 
We have, we t h k ,  shown 
cians are prone in a trawl c 
the adjudicative system with fhe 
the wrong question. But why does 
system appear to be ~eady to actep 
advice? The answer, we believe, lies 
longstanding tendency of the a 
system to defer to the scientifi 
ment. 
Courts have long been afraid that 
will fall prey to "junk sciknce." 
have dkmanded that an expert 
opinion be in accordance with a theory ehrt 
has aheved some threshold level af repc 
utability For most of thC 20th century, the 
dominant statement of this idea was the 
one in Frye x United Sbtes, 293 E, D.C. Cir. 
1923, hat the underlying " s c i d c  princi- 
ple or dkcway . . . hzfi which the deduc- 
tion is made must be & d y  &isheed 
to have @ g e n d  aceepfmce in the 
particular field in which it belong." 
Some @ata d l  adhere to the Frye test. 
But many jurisdictions have Jzlsnfiably 
come to the mdwion that its demand for 
"general acceptancen by the relevant scian- 
tific community as a peandition to I admissibility is too stringnt. Federal Rule 
of Evidence 702, which has beem adopted 
in many states, supports this view The Rule 
1 '  provides: 
"If scienti£k,- technical, or other speoal- 
ized knowledge will assist the trier of I ' fact to understand the evidence or to 
determine a fact in issue, a witness quali- 
fied as an expert by knowledge, skdl, 
experience, training, or education, may 
tesdy thereto in the form of an opinion 
or otherwise." 
In 1993, in Daubert v. M d l  Dow 
Pharmd~eutica2s Inc., 509 U.S. 579, the U.S. 
Supreme Court held unanimously that the 
"austere standardn of Frye is incompatible 
not only with the language 'bf Rule 702 but 
also with the liberal nature of the bles in 
general. A majority of the Court went 
beyond this mhg, however, and attempted 
to articulate the "gatekeeping role" that the 
judge must play when "[flaced with a prof- 
fer of expert scientdic testimony." 
Justice BlackmunS opinion for the 
majority expressly limited this discussion to 
evidence based on scientific knowledge, as 
opposed to "t&cal, or other specialized 
knpwledge," because that was the nature of 
the expertise offered in Daubert itself. 
Justice Bladrmun put great emphasis on 
Rule 7025 use of the tenn kientific . . . 
knowledge" and operated h m  the premise 
that, .ts quaQ as scientific knowledge, "an 
I inference or assertion must be derived by 
the scientific method." Thus, he attempted 
to articulate indicia of the scientific method, 
and he laid out four criteria that should 
often enter into determining "the scientific 
validity" of the principles underlying the 
evidence. The+ may be referred to as (1) 
testing, (2) peer review and pubbtim (3) 
error rates and standads, mrd - p a M y  
resumcting Frye just a few pages after its 
apparent death - (4) gem1 - p w .  
Our concern here is not mu& with 
the much-debyd q u e s ~ ~  of whether 
Daub& reflects good philoowphy of science, 
or even whether it reficts p a d  evid- 
policy Rather, the point of sigmfirwce here 
is that, though D d e r t  reflects a loosening 
of the demands purportedly applied under 
Frye, it still re£lects a notable attitude of clef- 
erence to the scientific estabkhment. (And 
this is an attitude thaz will be entrenched by 
pending amendments to Rule 702, whhr 
barring unforseen intervention by Congress 
will become effective December 1 of h i s  
year and wdl explicitly require the court to 
determine whether +ert testimony is "the 
pmduct of reliable principles and methods 
. . . applied . . . reliably to the facts of the 
case.") T ~ E  attitude is apparent in several 
respects. Most obviously perhaps, is the 
continued use of "general acceptance" as a 
criterion - albeit no longer the exclusive 
one - for determining a d ~ ~ t y  
Further, the other criteria constimte an 
adoption of currently prevalent scientific 
methods; the emphasis on peer review and 
publication also d e s  heavily on the atti- 
tudes of, and decisions made by the scien- 
tific establishment. Perhaps most funda- 
mentally, the entire inquiry seems gratu- 
itous. Under the language of Rule 702, 
notlung seems to depend on whether the 
knowledge on which the opinion is based is 
"scientificn or not. " [Slcientific" and "techni- 
cal" are clearly listed merely as illustlrations 
of "specialized knowledge"; the key ques- 
tion seems to be whether the opinion is 
based on "specialized knowledge [that] widl 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evi- 
dence or to determine a fact in issue." 
The bite of Daubertb insistence on scien- 
t&c methods was demonstrated in Genelrctl 
Electric Co. v.Jainer, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). 
There, the plainiff attempted to show that 
exposure to PCBs, a class of chemicals, 
could promote cancer. He presented the 
results of four studies, each of which failed 
on its own to provide stmng support for 
tlus condusion. One of his experts, a toxi- 
colog~~t named David Teitelbaum, testified 
- somewhat ungrammatically, but compre- 
hensibly enough - at a deposition: 
"[Als a toxicologist when I look at a 
study, I am going to reqyire that that 
study meet the general criteria for 
methodology and statistical analysis, but 
that when all of that data is collected 
and you ask me as a patient, 'Doctor, 
have I got a risk of getting cancer from 
this?' That those s t u d s  don't answer the 
question, that I have to put them all 
together in my mind and look at them 
in relation to eve- I know about 
the substance and everydung I know 
about the exposure and come to a con- 
clusion. I think when I say 'To a reason- 
able m e d a l  probabdity as a meka l ,  ' 
toxicologist, thzs substance was a con- 
tributing cause . . . to hts cancer,' that 
that is a valid conclusion based on the 
totahty of the evidence presented to me. 
And I t h d  &at that is an appropriate 
thing for a toxicologist to do, and it has 
been the basis of diagnosis for several 
hundred years, anywayn 
Justice Stevens agreed with Dr. 
Teitelbaum that " [i] t is not intrinsically 
'unscientific' for experienced professionals 
to arrive at a conclusion by weighmg all 
available scientific evidence - h s  is not 
the sort of 'junk science' with whch 
Daubert was concerned." But Justice Stevens 
stood alone. The rest of the Court upheld 
the trial court's decision that expert opin- 
ions like this one &d not rise above "sub- 
jective belief or unsupported speculation." 
A trial court, concluded the majority could 
validly decide to exclude "evidence which is 
connected to existing data only by the ipse 
dixit of the expert. A court may conclude 
that there is simply too great an analytical 
gap between the data and the opinion 
proffered." 
The fear of junk science - the concern 
that juries will be overwhelmed by h- 
canery hasqueradmg as science - has thus 
exerted a powerful effect on the American 
courts.' And perhaps a fear of their own 
inadequacy to separate the wheat p m  the 
chaff has left them to rely grealy on the 
attitudes and metha& of the scientific 
establishment. We do not mean to deny 
that a "gatekeeping role" for the courts is 
necessary; we assume that some evidence 
offered under the guise of science is of so 
little value, and sufficient prejudicial poten- 
tial, that exclusion is warranted. But we 
believe that deference to the scientific estab- 
hhment in an attempt to fend off junk sci- 
ence may create another problem - failure 
to recognize the extent to wluch, as we 
have suggested, the methods ordinarily 
used by scientists do not match up with the 
needs of the legal system. 
The Joiner majority's castigation of the 
toxicologist's qpinion as "subjective belief' 
reflects shis failure. Adjudication, we have 
argued, depends on subjective assessments 
of factual issues, and courts are fooling 
themselves if they pretend otherwise. 
Sometimes, scientists can present to the 
jury generalized propositions of the type 
that they try to demonstrate in their oqd- 
nary non-forensic work. But adjudication 
usually depends on the particulars of the 
case at hand. 
Often hs means that the law needs to 
decide non-recunent matters for which, 
because it is impossible to run a controlled 
experiment or even to gather data across 
like cases, the scientific method d be use- 
less. And yet, in such cases scientifically 
based information may be useful in trying 
to determine the facts. The subjective belief 
of an expert who has had extensive experi- 
ence in d h g  with problems of a roughly 
similar nature may be particularly useful ig 
bridging the gap between those principles 
plld tht available ovidmcz This ia.pfm @ 
~ , f m e m m p ~ ~ i n p s e s h w h i & ~  
engineer offen an e q h ~ t i o h  far rn atxi* 
dent that is s h r  in some q e c d  
other accidents but unique in sane 
respects. Even if the experts opinion is an 
wel'1"grounded on scientific pincplees, her 
observations and judgment, basedl on 
extensive experience, m y  be8 usefjd.*For 
this reason, we find the ColurtS dedbion in 
Kumho Tirt Co. v. Cannichuel, 526 U.S. 137 
(!999), somewhat curious. 'She expert r,atS- 
mony offekd there - that of an expen om 
tire failure - was clearly n t scipxiiic. But 9 the Court held that the ~ a l  jud& had not 
abused hts discretion ih applying the 
Daubert .criteria. To the extent that judges 
apply those criteria in determining the 
admissibility of evidence that does ndt evm 
purport to bescientific, Kumho wilI repre- 
sent a further, and misguided, incursion by 
science, @o the realm of law. Fortunately1 
and appropfiatelfi the Court emphasized 
that the Daubeft criteria are not mandatay 
on the tnal c$mrt - even with respect to 
purportedly scientific evidence. 
Even if the matter on which an expert 
wishes to offer an opinion is a recurrent 
one, so that science can in time yield w 
answer with confidence, science may nat be 
ready to,do so before h e  legal 'iystem needs 
guidance. Udke scientific inquiry, Justice 
Blackmun pointed out in D#ubert, law 
"must resolve hputes finally and quickly"; 
evidentiary rules are "designed not- for the 
exhaustive search for cosmic understa~~dmg 
but for the particuhzed resolution dl& 
disputes." But the Court seems to ~ V E  
failed to realire the imPlica& of per- 
spective. It does not weigh in favor af 
excluding sciennfk evidence, or af & f a g  
to the scientific establishmeit, but m k  in
favor of recognizing that the law must satis- 
fy  its own needs for scientific advice, even if 
dolng so does not square with t h e . u d  
methods of scientists. . 
In apy case, if a scientist is damg mmrr: 
than reciting general principles withbut an 
attempt to relate them to the facts of the 
case, the lawS treatment of scientific evi- 
dence must take into account the adjudi~a- 
tive context in whch the evidence is 
offered. That context difleqs sigdicantly 
(r,-m the one in which scientists are used to 
\\r,,rIilng -- most notably with respect to 
c\lci,:nce of a DNA database search, in that 
tb:. ~ury's job is at base a subjective one and 
In that thc brinpng of the case tends to 
dchnc the propositions at issue. 
Our perspective may perhaps be crystal- 
\,zed by comparing it to that of Anders 
Stocl;marr, one of the statisticians who has 
untttn in support of the NRC approach to 
the DNA database search problem. "The 
decision problem of the court," he has writ- 
ten, "should take the implications of statisti- 
cal h)potheses for data descnption into 
mount, and not the other way around." In 
our \iew, this is precisely wrong. The legal 
system is a consumer of the information 
offered by expert witnesses. It may be that 
the senice needed by the legal system 
requires scientists to operate in ways at vari- 
ance with their usual operating methods. 
The law should not be a passive consumer 
of scientifically based information, taking 
what scientists have to offer "off the rack." 
Rqthcr, it should be an aggressive consumer, 
asking its suppliers to provide what it 
needs. 
This perspective, which has sometimes 
been apparent in debates concerning psy- 
chiatric testimony, may be helpful across 
the range of expert testimony What the law 
needs is not necessanly information 
processed in the usual ways of science, but 
rather information that will be helpful to 
the jurors in making their best subjective 
assessment of the particular issues at stake 
in the case at hand. Of course, like any con- 
sumer, the law can only ask the supplier to 
provide what the supplier can. But in the 
implicit negotiation between law and sci- 
ence, the law has one advantage that most 
consumers do not have: It sets the rules. 
The courts should reco~nize that what they 
need from science is not the usual output of 
the scientific community, but rather a spe- 
clal product more tailored to adjudicative 
neecis. Then they may better play the role of 
awessi\re consumer, and so better secure 
inlormation thdt will be of help to the trier 
of f2ct. 
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